Introduction
The current environment in the freight rail industry is one characterized by mergers and acquisitions intended to improve operating efficiencies and enhance profitability. The resulting dominance of the market by a few large companies might be expected to result in increased scrutiny by regulatory agencies as has occurred in other industries. Amore balanced understanding of the role of the federal government in regulating railroad operations, however, requires familiarity with more than a cenhuy of government involvement with the industry. This perspective is helpful in explaining the current public policy environment relative to freight railroads, but is also instructive with regard to the potential impact of government involvement in other sectors of the economy. 
The Creation of Conrail and its Impact on Railroad Regulation
By Gregg Guetschow and government. States provided charters to companies seeking to provide rail services and the federal government granted land and powers of eminent domain to enable the laying of rail lines. Initially the states and later the federal government regulated rates for rail services. During World War I the federal government nationalized the railroads, subsequently returning them to private operators. Beginning in the early 1970s, in response to concerns for the viability of railroads generally and in reaction to the bankruptcy of the largest railroads, the policy of the federal government toward railroads shifted.
As an aid to analyzing this development, the stages of the policy process outlined in B. Guy Peters' American Public Policy will be employed.
1 These stagesagenda setting, policy formulation, legislative legitimation, budgeting, organizational setting, implementation, evaluation, and policy change-provide a framework for understanding the intricacies of policy formulation in general, and, in this case, the formulation of contemporary railroad policy in particular.
History of Federal Regulation
In fostering the development of the rail industry in the United States, the federal government adopted an attitude that went well beyond laissez-faire and constituted a significant helping hand in the form of land grants and powers of condemnation. These tools were necessary to insure that rail transportation would be available to assist in the opening of the West and the industrialization of the economy.
Railroading quickly became a lucrative enterprise.
Operating free of regulation and, in many cases, as monopolies, railroad owners were able to charge rates sufficient to insure significant return on their investments. This financial performance attracted additional capital in the form of competing railroads. Cartels soon developed within the industry to control rates. However, because these cartels rarely were able to control defectors, rate wars were commonplace. Against this backdrop, and in the absence of federal regulation, several states passed legislation to regulate the rates charged by railroads. 2 Subsequent to a U.S. Supreme Court decision that found state regulation of railroads to be unconstitutional, the U.S. Congress passed the Interstate
Commerce Act in 1887 and set up the first transportation regulatory commission.
3
In establishing the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC), the Congress sought to bring order to the rail industry through oversight of rates charged by railroads.
The relationship between railroads and the government embodied in the 1887 legislation reflected the perception that railroads had a public character and so should serve the public interese
The act embodied common law principles applicable to common carriers, requiring rates be reasonable, discrimination against shippers be prohibited, and preferences among areas be banned. s Subsequent amendments, necessitated by gaps in the original legislation, expanded the control of the ICC to include setting maximum and minimum rates, regulating railroad mergers, and controlling the abandonment of rail lines. Further, the ICC was charged with carrying out other national policies through its regulatory actions, such as equalization of port traffic and assistance to agriculture and depressed industries. The result of this approach to regulation was the establishment, in effect, of a government-sponsored carte1. 7 
14

POLICY PERSPECTIVES
Problems in the Rail Industry
Concerns over the health of the rail industry had surfaced during discussions about the return of the railroads to private operation following World War I. These concerns led to the passage of the Transportation Act of 1920, which attempted to maintain common carrier service obligations and guarantee adequate rates of return.~ The act permitted the ICC to set minimum rates, transferred entry into and exit from routes from the states to the ICC, granted the ICC the right to promote mergers of railroads as a means of rationalizing service, and provided guaranteed loans for weaker railroads.
Problems in the rail industry became particularly pronounced beginning in the 1950s. The Transportation Act of 1958 offered some relief by allowing railroads more flexibility in reducing rates and abandoning unprofitable • 9 passenger serVIces.
Factors negatively affecting the financial strength of the railroads were evident nationally but their effects were more pronounced in the Northeast. The labor environment under which railroads operated also contributed to their poor financial performance.
Work rules affecting train crews resulted in inefficient staffing and a lack of productivity in yard operations. The effect of this change on the rail industry was a reduction in profitability. The ICC noted a rate of return on net worth for the entire industry in 1969 of just one percent, as compared to 14.9 percent for common carrier trucking. 12 The industry responded by merging railroads, seeking to abandon unprofitable lines, and by postponing capital investment. However, the ICC was slow in granting merger requests; many required a period of several years before final approval. Those that were approved reflected an ICC bias in favor of parallel mergers intended to eliminate duplicate lines, even though studies had questioned the advisability of such mergers 13 and had further suggested that there were diseconomies of scale in the merging oflarge railroads.
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The ICC responded to political pressure to require service be maintained on branch lines. In concluding that the public interest was reflected in the availability of rail services, it typically required the continuation of unprofitable lines. 1s The least used, and consequently less profitable, branch lines tended to be approved for abandonment more quickly than more heavily used and more profitable lines. 16 Shippers sought to maintain branch lines as a tool to maintain competition for trucking firms even if they were not using those lines. 17 The ICC expected that unprofitable branch lines would be subsidized by profitable main lines, just as it required that unprofitable passenger service be subsidized by profitable freight service.
1s
The squeeze on profitability left railroads with little capital available to invest in repairing aging track. As a result, trains were forced to operate at slower than optimum speeds in order to avoid derailments. The rates charged for freight encouraged assembling longer trains, which necessitated keeping cars in rail yards for extended periods. Further, the need to insure compatible hardware across the industry so that cars could be shared among railroads limited the ability to modernize equipment. These and other factors related to the very nature of the industry resulted in slow product delivery; those products that were shipped tended to be low in value relative to weight since these benefited from lower rates.
The more highly valued but lighter products were uneconomical to ship by rail not only because of the rate structure 19 but also because they suffered more damage due to the way in which trains were assembled from individual cars.
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The Penn Central Crisis 
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Agenda Setting
Peters notes a number of factors which are important in moving a problem onto the institutional agenda so that Congress may consider action. 29 Those factors relevant to the case of the Northeast rail crisis included the visibility of the problem, a concentration of victims in a particular region, the absence of priva te means, and, particularly with regard to the demand for deregulation, the spillover effect of other government programs related to transportation.
Problems in the rail industry were not news to the Congress. Hearings had been held as early as 1958. 30 While various committees held hearings on aspects of the Penn Central crisis, these tended to focus on corporate mismanagement rather than on problems within the rail industry as a whole. 31 In testimony before the Senate Surface Transportation subcommittee, there was a lack of unanimity regarding the cause of the present crisis or its ultimate solution. 32 The issue of nationalizing the railroads had been raised in comments on the Senate floor, but no serious effort was being made to advance legislative proposals. 33
Further, bankruptcy of a railroad generally had not been a reason for congressional action. The provisions of the bankntptcy code favored reorganization or acquisition by another railroad, subject to ICC approval. The ability to restructure debt could enable a continuation of operations.
This was not to be the case with the Penn Central, however. The size of the enterprise alone made it impossible to find a takeover candidate. Wilner (1997) states that the company was too large to be taken over by any entity other than the federal government. 34 After failing to find prospects for a takeover of operations, the bankruptcy court began to entertain proposals for liquidation of assets in order to satisfy creditors, an action that would have resulted in the end of rail service in much of the Northeast. 35 The Second, even though the unions had indicated that they would consider addressing the problem of archaic work rules, the trustees unilaterally modified these rules. 41 As expected, the United Transportation Union struck the railroad, shutting down its operations. 
Policy Formulation
The passage of the joint resolution ending the strike Creative policy formulation often results from an environment characterized by a lack of information about a problem and the absence of a theory of causation. 47 Despite the significant effects of the rail problems throughout the Northeast, no clear consensus had been achieved about their causes, nor was it known that these problems were industry-wide in scope, unrelated to the management of particular railroads. That this environment would yield the legislative solutions that it did, particularly when developed principally by interest groups, seems consistent with Peters.
The Regional Rail Reorganization Act 0/1973
The Union Pacific railroad viewed the various legislative proposals skeptically and was concerned that the failure to arrive at a reasonable legislative solution would result in liquidation of the Penn Central.
This outcome would have been detrimental to its in-
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POLICY PERSPECTIVES terests in that 25 percent of its business originated or terminated in the Northeast. 48 As a consequence, it sought to craft a legislative solution that would address the Penn Central crisis. The chief counsel of the Union Pacific was the principal author of the legislation. 49 This legislation, which was to become the 3R Act, provided for the creation of the United States Railway Association (USRA), a non-profit corporation which would issue federally-guaranteed loans for the opera- 
THE CREATION OF CONRAIL
The Railroad Revitalization and
Regulatory Reform Act of 1976
The 4R Act was necessary to implement the recommendations from the USRA regarding rail service in the Northeast, but it also incorporated provisions necessary to address the problems in rail service nationwide. However, the administration's hopes were focused on the bill's regulatory reform provisions. In an effort to restrict the ICC's influence on factors affecting the profitability of railroads, the ICC was required to find market dominance before continuing rate regulation for a railroad. Further, the process of abandonment was to be modified so as to speed up the elimination of unprofitable lines.
Legislative Legitimation
The 3R Act Albright observes that "it is no wonder that the legislative history of the Northeast railroad bill is confusing, in that it was designed and pushed through
Congress by officers of special-interest groups that stand to benefit from its provisions." As major bills go, Congress did not put a lot of work into this one. Union Pacific supplied the bill. First National City Bank supplied the financial data. The United Transportation Union supplied the labor contracts. Committee work was minimal. So was floor debate. Support from the South and West was whipped into line with a tart reminder that X thousands of freight cars a day rolled into the Northeast with products from other regions. A largely disinterested House passed the bill in November 1973. There was some wrangling in the conference committee, but a largely disinterested Senate, already melting away for the Christmas holiday, passed it in December. The administration put on a blustery show of defiance, claiming it was too costly a burden on the taxpayer (which it wasn't -banks were going to supply most of the capital), but Nixon signed it early in January. Such was the Regional Rail Reorganization Act of 1973.
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The 4R Act Richard Shoup and Brock Adams were already celebrated by the rail industry for their role in passing the 3R Act. They would also sponsor the 4R Act in 1976.
For the most part, the act reflected the outcomes of the Final System Plan developed by the USRA pursuant to the 3R Act. Accordingly, the act included the funds estimated to be required to provide the assistance which Conrail and other railroads would need for operations and capital investments.
Perhaps largely because this act was seen as a continuation of the earlier legislative effort, passage of 
Budgeting
Carter signaled an end to funding for Conrail.
The 3R Act The 3R Act was specifically designed to President Reagan would go even further by sugavoid a problem with the Nixon administration regard-gesting that Conrail be broken up and sold off pieceing the impact on the budget. It is for that reason that meal to other railroads. The impact of these positions the funds made available for the rehabilitation of will be discussed in greater detail below.
railroads were provided through government guaranteed loans. This funding was "off-budget," analogous to debt issued through Fannie Mae. It would not be subject to the national debt ceiling and, therefore, was beyond the reach of the Office of Management and Budget in exercising its veto over the spending. 55 The 3R Act authorized the USRA to issue debt up to $1.5 billion, $1 billion of which was designated for
Conrail. At least half of this latter amount was to be used for plant modernization. Five hundred million dollars was slated for upgrade of the Boston-Washington route that was to be sold or leased to Amtrak.
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The 4R Act The 4R Act provided $500 million over four years as subsidies for branch lines; $600 million in grants and $1 billion in guaranteed loans to weak railroads; $1.75 billion to upgrade Amtrak's BostonWashington route; and $2.1 billion in subsidies for
Conrail. 57 This latter amount was determined to be necessary, according to USRA forecasts, to cover operating losses until Conrail could be returned to profitability.
However, it was believed that if USRA's projections were off by just three-quarters of one percent, Conrail would have a net deficit of $368 million instead of the projected operating income of $1.699 billion. had appointed two pro-deregulation economists to the commission. However, it was widely believed that legiSlation more favorable to deregulation would be required. 69 
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POLICY PERSPECTIVES
Evaluation
The 3R Act was, to some extent, an evaluation mechanism relative to the resolution of the Northeast rail crisis. By establishing a three-way competition among the DOT, USRA and the ICC, the Act assured a series of reports and commentaries regarding the recommendations for resolving the crisis. Ultimately, however, this would prove to be of value only to the extent to which the agencies responded to one another since Congress was limited to a 60-day period within which to consider the recommendation for reorganization. In general, the attempt to improve the railroad's financial situation was seen as unsuccessful, which had led to the conclusion that efforts to effect that change by working through the ICC were not likely to achieve the results which had been anticipated. 72 The General Accounting Office (GAO), which had responsibility for auditing Conrail's performance, stated "Conrail assumed in its plans that regulatory reform would enable it to make pricing and plant rationalization changes that would produce revenues it could use to rejuvenate its capital programs. Regulatory reform may not allow the freedoms Conrail anticipated.,,73
Changes in Policy
The The ICC was defensive of its role in implementing regulatory reform, particularly with regard to the issue of abandonments, an area in which it reported improvements. Those improvements were an outcome of a court decision adverse to the ICC with regard to its interpretation of the requirements of the 4R Act concerning abandonments. The ICC noted that "Conrail has made a highly publicized management decision not to take any actions toward rationalizing its plant before the Congress acts on rail deregulation." 7 " Working with House counsel, Representative James
Florio drafted a bill that would allow for railroads to automatically adjust the rates that they charge to haul products." While the amount of rate adjustment in any year was limited, and there were protections for captive shippers, the net effect of the bill was to deregulate railroads with regard to most rate setting. While the STB retains many of the ICC's functions and much of its independence, its authority must be periodically renewed by Congress. 88 This passage highlights well the incremental nature of the process of developing public policy in this area. 
Analysis and Conclusions
